This paper characterizes higher order risk e¤ects, such as prudence and temperance, via preferences that partially order a set of simple 50-50 lotteries. In particular, consider the random variables e X N ; e Y N ; e X M and e Y M , and assume that e X i dominates e Y i via i th -order stochastic dominance for i = M; N . We show that the 50-50 lottery
Introduction
Choice under uncertainty is often model speci…c. Much debate in the literature discusses the pros and cons of the various types of valuation methods used in modeling such decisions. The choice is made much easier when we have stochastic dominance by one of the alternatives. In such a case, we will have agreement on the optimal choice by a wide range of valuation methods. For example, suppose a corporation believes its shareholders are all risk averse, de…ned as an aversion to mean-preserving spreads 1 . Its shareholders would then unanimously favor a decision yielding the random payout variable e X over the alternative set of payo¤s e Y , whenever e X dominates e Y via second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). This holds true for any model of preferences that preserves a preference for SSD. For example, in an expected-utility framework, this would hold whenever the utility function is increasing and concave.
The link between stochastic dominance and preferences within expected-utility 1 See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) .
is particularly well known. If we restrict the utility function u to be di¤erentiable, then N th -order stochastic dominance (NSD) of e X over e Y is equivalent to unanimous preference of e X over e Y by any individual whose utility exhibits certain properties.
This equivalence has implications for non-expected utility models as well. For example, suppose that all individuals with expected-utility preferences that satisfy NSD preference unanimously prefer e X to e Y , then any non-expected utility preference functional that satis…es NSD preference would also lead to the choice of e X over e Y . 
and de…ne
De…nition 1 We say that the distribution F weakly dominates the distribution G in the sense of N th -order stochastic dominance if
We write F NSD G to denote F dominates G via N th -order stochastic dominance.
If the random variables e X and e Y have cumulative distribution functions denoted by F and G respectively, we will take the liberty to also say that e X NSD e Y . For N = 1; 2; 3, we will use the more common notations for …rst-, second, and thirdorder stochastic dominance: F SD, SSD and T SD.
As a special case of stochastic dominance, Ekern (1980) considers the following:
Note that G has more N th -degree risk than F is equivalent to saying that F NSD G and the …rst N 1 moments of F and G are identical. 4 The following two theorems express the well-known links between stochastic dominance and expected utility, as well as Ekern's extension of this result to increases in N th degree risk. 5 Here we let u(w) denote the individual's utility function. For notational convenience, we use u (n) (w) to denote
Theorem 1
The following are equivalent: 
The second condition follows easily from part (ii) in the de…nition by integrating both
and G (i) by parts. The case where N = 3 is labeled as an "increase in downside risk" and given special attention in a paper by Menezes et al. (1980) . The case where N = 4 is examined in part by Menezes and Wang (2005) . 5 See Hadar and Russell (1969) and Hanoch and Levy (1969) who introduced this notion into the economics literature for SSD. See Jean (1980) and Whitmore (1989) , as well as Ingersoll (1987) for extensions to higher orders of stochastic dominance.
Main Result
In this section, we examine a particular lottery preference over random wealth variables that can be ordered via stochastic dominance. We show how this lottery preference relates to higher order risk e¤ects, such as prudence and temperance. Our characterization is a generalization of the concept "risk apportionment," as introduced by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) . In particular, their characterization can be shown to be a special case of our results here.
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) consider two basic "harms," namely a sure loss and a zero-mean risk. They start from an arbitrary (possibly random) initial wealth level and consider two alternative 50-50 lotteries that will be added to the initial wealth: the …rst consisting of a 50-50 chance of either one harm or the other harm, and the second consisting of a 50-50 chance of adding either both harms simultaneously or adding neither. An individual is de…ned as being "prudent" if he or she always would prefer the …rst of these two lotteries, which they label as a desire to "disaggregate" these two harms. They then show how this de…nition, which they also label as "risk apportionment of order 3," is equivalent to the existing de…nition of prudence as given by Kimball (1990) .
Replacing the sure loss above with a second zero-mean risk that is statistically independent from the …rst, they then show that a desire to disaggregate these two harms (i.e., preference for a 50-50 lottery adding one risk or the other risk over a 50-50 lottery adding the sum of both risks or adding neither) is equivalent to the de…nition of "temperance" as described by Kimball (1992) and Gollier and Pratt (1996) . This lottery preference is also labeled as "risk apportionment of order 4."
Proceding recursively and allowing the 50-50 lotteries generated to be considered the relative "harms," Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger characterize "risk apportionment of order N:" Moreover, it is shown that preferences satisfy risk apportionment of orders 
Proof. Let T be a positive integer and de…ne U T fu j sgn u (n) (w) = ( 1) n+1 for n = 1; :::; T g. For an arbitrary function u 2 U N +M de…ne v(w)
Eu( e X M +w), where E denotes the expectation operator. We …rst show that v 2 U N .
To see this, consider any integer
The condition that e X N dominates e Y N via N th -order stochastic dominance, to-
, which by the de…nition of v is equivalent to
Rearranging terms above, this inequality is equivalent to
which is precisely the lottery preference claimed in the theorem.
The lottery preference expressed in the Theorem 3 is analogous to the notion of "disaggregating the harms" discussed by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), if we interpret the "harms" as sequentially replacing each of the e X random variables with a e Y random variable in the sum e X N + e X M . Or, said di¤erently, it expresses a preference for lotteries that combine relatively good assets with relatively bad ones.
The preferences described here lead to a partial ordering of the four alternative sums of random variables, based upon stochastic dominance criteria:
Note that the sums e X M + e Y N and e X N + e Y M cannot be ordered via stochastic dominance. In the spirit of Menezes and Wang (2005) we can refer to these two sums as the "inner risks" and the sums e X N + e X M and e Y N + e Y M as the "outer risks." Theorem 3 thus expresses a preference for a 50-50 lottery over the two inner risks as opposed to a 50-50 lottery over the two outer risks. 6 The following Corollary extends this result to Ekern's ordering by N th -degree risk. The proof follows easily from the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary 4
Suppose that e Y i has more i th -degree risk than e X i for i = M; N . Then the lottery [ e X N + e X M ; e Y N + e Y M ] has more (N + M ) th -degree risk than the lottery
Applications
In this section we illustrate the applicability of our results. In particular, we …rst demonstrate how Theorem 3 and its corollary can be used to gain insight into a few extant concepts such as downside risk aversion and other higher-order e¤ects of risk preferences. We then turn to two economic examples that can apply our results directly to decision making under risk.
Aversion to Downside Risk
We …rst use an illustration that is the result of an experiment by Mao (1970) , and was used by Menezes et al. (1980) to motivate the concept of aversion to downside risk (i.e. prudence). Consider the following two lotteries. Lottery A pays 1000 with a probability of 3 4 and pays 3000 with a probability of 1 4 . Lottery B pays zero with a probability of 1 4 and pays 2000 with a probability of 3 4 . 
Higher-order E¤ects of Risk
Within expected-utility models, the signs of the derivatives on the utility function all have some economic meaning. Temperance, u (4) < 0, is a fourth-order e¤ect.
Theorem 3 can be used to give two alternative equivalences to temperance.
Let X a = X b = 0 and let e Y a and e Y b be independent zero-mean risks. 
Precautionary saving
Consider a simple two-period model of consumption and saving. An individual has a random income of e X at date t = 0 and income e Y at date t = 1. The individual decides to save some of her income at date t = 0 and to consume the rest. She must decide on how much to save before learning the realized value of e X. Thus, her consumption at date t = 0 is e X s, where s is the amount saved. If s < 0, the consumer is borrowing money (i.e. negative savings) and consuming more than the realized value of e X at date t = 0. We assume that the interest rate for borrowing or lending is zero and that there is no time-discounting for valuing consumption at date t = 1. At this date the individual consumes her income plus any savings, e Y + s.
Let s denote the individual's optimal choice for savings.
Suppose that e X dominates e Y via N th -order stochastic dominance. For any nonnegative scalar ' 0, since ' dominates ' by FSD, it follows from Theorem 3 that the 50-50 lottery [( e X '); ( e Y + ')] dominates [( e X + '); ( e Y ')] by (N+1)SD.
Reinterpretting the "50-50 lottery" [A; B] as sequential consumption of A at t = 0
and B at t = 1, Theorem 3 implies that saving an arbitrary amount ' 0 always dominates saving the amount ', whenever preferences satisfy (N + 1) th -degree stochastic dominance preference. It follows that we must have s 0 for this individual.
For example, suppose that one's income is risky in both periods, but it is riskier in the sense of SSD next period. Anyone with preferences satisfying third-order stochastic dominance preference would prefer to save money rather than to borrow money. 7 If instead of SSD we assume that next period's income is stochastically higher than this period's via FSD, then any individual who is risk averse (i.e. satisfying SSD preference) will prefer to borrow rather than save.
After-tax pro…ts
Consider a risk neutral corporation with taxable pro…t e X in country A and taxable pro…t e Y in country B. We assume that the tax schedule is identical in both countries
and that e X SSD e Y . The tax owed on realized pro…t is denoted by t( ). The tax schedule is assumed to be increasing with a marginal tax rate that is also increasing, but at a decreasing rate. 8 After tax pro…ts can thus be written as u( ) = t( ).
If t( ) is di¤erentiable, our assumptions about t imply that u 00 ( ) < 0 and u 000 ( ) > 0.
Moreover, since we should also have t 0 ( ) < 1 for any pro…t level , it follows that u 0 ( ) > 0 as well.
Suppose now that the corporation has a new project with a pre-tax distribution 7 For example, suppose that e X is a constant equal to E e Y and that preferences are given by expected utility. Then this result coincides with that of Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) , for the case where preferences display prudence, u 000 > 0. 8 This assumption is realistic since the marginal rate is often bounded by some maximum, such as …fty percent of additional pro…t.
of pro…t e Z, where e Z > 0 a.s. The corporation must decide whether to locate the project in country A or in country B. The after-tax total pro…t of the corporation is given by u( A ) + u( B ), where i denotes the realized pre-tax pro…t in country i, for i = A; B. Since e Z dominates zero by FSD, it follows from Theorem 3 that
, since the valuation function u (i.e. aftertax pro…ts) satis…es third-order stochastic dominance preference. Thus, the …rm should locate the new project in country B in order to maximize its global after-tax pro…t.
Concluding Remarks
Hedging has long been a capstone of risk-management strategy. Faced with an initially risky wealth prospect, one can add a position in another asset whose payo¤ is negatively correlated to the original risky wealth. Such an asset will usually have a positive net payo¤ in states of the world in which the random wealth would otherwise have been low. If we assume risk aversion, then marginal utility in low-wealth states is higher and therefore such a hedge is valuable to a risk averter. The cost of such hedging is that the net payo¤ is usually negative in states of the world in which the random wealth would otherwise have been high. In a certain sense, hedging pairs up relatively good outcomes on one asset with relatively bad outcomes on another asset, and vice versa.
By contrast, risk apportionment pairs relatively good assets with relatively bad ones. It assumes that the payo¤s on the assets are independent, which is antithetical to the premise of hedging. Given the partial ordering in (3), we prefer a 50-50 gamble between the two "inner risks" as opposed to the two outer ones. Here relatively "good" and "bad" are determined via stochastic dominance rankings. Under expected utility, this ranking coincides with a utility function (or some other valuation function) whose derivatives alternate in sign. If these rankings hold for all orders of stochastic dominance, then they would coincide with preferences that are completely monotone, as described by Brockett and Golden (1987) and Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) .
The lottery preference described in this paper generalizes the concept "risk apportionment," as introduced by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) . One strength of their result is the simplicity of their characterization of lower levels of risk apportionment via a preference over simple 50-50 lotteries. However, their characterization is less simple for higher orders, since it requires that they construct larger and larger nestings of simple lotteries. A strength of this paper is that we can characterize any degree of risk apportionment by a preference between two simple 50-50 lotteries.
We provided several interpretations and applications of our main theoretical re-sult, Theorem 3. Our results also can be used to add intuition to many other extant concepts in the literature, such as skewness preference (see Chiu 2005 ) and transfer principles in income redistribution (see Fishburn and Willig 1984 and Moyes 1999) .
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